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Abstract 
This paper evaluates challenges and opportunities for biomass fueled distributed 
generation (DG) power systems in Brazil. We were particularly interested in biomass because of 
its enormous technical potential and co-location with electricity load centers, and the DG model 
because it is emerging as a means to achieve regional grid stability. Brazil has long been an 
advocate of renewable energy, yet has failed to develop a more robust biomass market, and its 
electric grid is highly dependent on long-distance transmission from large-scale hydro stations. 
We assessed the macroeconomic condition of the country, business environment, 
energy markets, energy regulations, and logistics of biomass fuel procurement. We interviewed 
energy regulators, industry trade associations, energy consultants, stakeholders in the biomass 
segment, and companies developing biomass power projects. Additionally, we comprehensively 
researched recent open source materials in order to get a clear picture of the current market 
dynamics. 
Our findings suggest three primary reasons for the poor utilization of biomass power in 
Brazil: failure to acknowledge critical vulnerabilities in hydro capacity factors, deficient 
transportation infrastructure, and price supports that artificially improve the competitiveness 
of other power sources. Nevertheless, it appears that eucalyptus is emerging as a viable fuel for 
industrial DG applications. 
Finally, we conclude that excessive development in the Amazonia region has increased 
the probability that Brazil experiences a phenomenon called ‘Dieback’, wherein the rainforest 
ecosystem will transform from a global sink to a global source of Carbon. This could exacerbate 
warming trends that have compromised the country’s hydro-reservoirs, and consequently 
stands to jeopardize Brazil’s entire electric grid. The recent drought conditions and the 
electricity blackouts confirm our findings. 
Neither biomass power nor DG systems can address looming energy shortages, but they 
do present an opportunity to insulate electricity consumers from the costs incurred by 
intermittency.  Moreover, leveraging biomass power is in line with the country’s high 
prioritization of renewable energy, and it has the potential to make-up for stubborn pre-sal 
natural resources that remain locked undersea. We recommend that Brazil recognize the 
systemic risks posed by further hydro development, and support biomass DG as a means to 
shave electricity load demand from already compromised hydro reservoirs. 
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Executive Summary 
Our research explored opportunities for biomass fueled distributed generation (DG) 
power systems in Brazil.  DG is defined as an electric power source connected directly to the 
distribution network on the customer side of the meter.1  The biomass fuels we examined were 
sugarcane bagasse, the leftover stalk from sugar production, and eucalyptus, which is used for 
paper, pulp and fiberboard production.  Legislation, investment subsidies, and tax incentives for 
DG power are confined to the sub 30MW range.  Despite these incentives and technical 
potential, the cost of fuel procurement combined with the lack of scale efficiencies by small-
scale power stations render biomass power in the DG range to be uneconomical under most 
circumstances.  Hydropower projects bidding electricity for $0.045/kWh in auctions, high 
transport costs, a risk-averse investment environment, and energy auction supports for other 
renewables are contributing factors.  Nevertheless, we anticipate that accounting for the 
combined costs incurred by seasonal intermittency from climate compromised hydro reservoirs 
and burdensome electricity taxes, industrial users will find sub-30 MW biomass fueled systems 
more economical despite the initial capital costs.  
Biomass fuel made from sugarcane bagasse is, and will remain, the predominant 
feedstock for the universe of biomass fueled systems.  We believe verticalization of eucalyptus 
production into industrial supply chains will become the dominant business model specifically 
for the industrial biomass DG market. We expect this market to be primarily populated by 
petrochemicals companies, iron and steel mills, agribusiness, and food and beverage 
businesses. 
There are four notable drivers of this market growth. First, biomass is a process efficient 
option. Both fuels have impressive heating values, are good feedstock for charcoal production, 
and can be used to produce process steam and cooling. Second, it facilitates a tangible and 
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defensible transition towards sustainable energy development, which is increasingly considered 
valuable by energy intensive businesses.  Third, having a biomass system on-site can insulate an 
electricity user from the extraordinarily high cost of electricity delivery, rated the third most 
expensive for industrial consumers.  Lastly, it provides a critical back up to grid electricity, which 
is significantly compromised by climate-induced drought conditions.  
Deforestation in the Amazon is accelerating aridity in the eastern portion of the country. 
The past three years have experienced persistent drought conditions. Brazil’s hydro reservoir 
system, which supplies 76% of the country’s electricity, is at 20-year lows. Permitting and 
approval of planned hydro projects is taking much longer than expected, wind development is 
running into difficulty, and the stubbornness of pre-sal development has cast doubt on the 
feasibility of complementing hydro deficiencies with thermal power. These circumstances 
combined with the fact that Brazil’s ambitious energy expansion plan barely meets annual 
growth projections, suggests anyone who can, ought to develop electricity self-sufficiency. Even 
under an ideal scenario, where climate trends reverse and pre-sal production becomes prolific, 
the inability of the government and its utilities to keep pace with much needed transmission 
system improvements leaves the whole grid worrisomely fragile. 
The industrial segment, which is heavily reliant on hydropower, is particularly vulnerable 
to un-planned intermittency. Industrial facilities that augment power needs with DG systems 
are effectively insuring themselves against climate induced hydro reservoir depletion. Unless 
pre-sal oil production expedites miraculously, there aren’t many alternative fuel options. 
Fortunately, both eucalyptus and sugar production are co-located with industrial hubs. 
Unfortunately, the roads between them are terrible. 
To help reduce the economic costs and development problems incurred from large-scale 
hydro intermittency, the government would be well advised to facilitate support to the biomass 
for power market through its existing infrastructure development plans and by accounting for 
benefits of biomass such as being seasonally complementary to hydro low levels, not requiring 
transmission systems, and being carbon neutral. Support should be offered to the industrial 
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segment in the form of tax incentives and write downs for the capital costs of biomass turbine 
systems, and also to sugar mills and eucalyptus plantations that seek to provide feedstock fuel 
for these systems. The business environment already resembles an oligopoly, so our 
recommendation of interventionist, top-down economic manipulation to achieve these ends is 
realistic and achievable.  We believe that the net benefits of these manipulations include 
maintaining a low carbon, high output electric grid, and addressing the industrial segment’s 
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1 Macro-economic picture in Brazil  
Brazil is the seventh richest economy in the world with a 
GDP of $2.2 trillion in 2011, and the largest in terms of area 
and population in Latin America. The country’s economy is 
heavily dependent on commodities export and with cooling 
demand from some of its largest trading partners (China, US 
etc.) the country is experiencing a widespread economic slowdown after witnessing years of 
robust growth. The slowdown has exacerbated already complex challenges facing the 
businesses and critical infrastructure that facilitate economic growth. There are three main 
factors that have contributed to this current state of worrying economic activity for the 
country, in the face of cooling demand for its exports.  
First and foremost is the country’s aging and inadequate infrastructure. Brazil’s quality 
of infrastructure is ranked 104th out of 142 countries, behind China (69th), India (86th) and 
Russia (100th), per a survey conducted by the World Economic Forum.1 There is consensus 
amongst economists and investment banks that Brazil must invest 4% of GDP for 20 years to be 
at par with Chile, the current benchmark in Latin America, and 6-8% of GDP to be at par with 
South Korea, the benchmark in Asia.2 In contrast, the government is slated to spend just 1% of 
GDP on infrastructure in the period 2011-2014. Under normal circumstances this level of 
spending is insufficient to galvanize an economy teetering on the brink of recession, let alone to 
Figure 1 Source: Economic Intelligence Unit 
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showcase its economic prowess to the world during the fast approaching Football world cup in 
2014 or Olympic Games in 2016.3  
The second factor contributing to the slowdown, similar to what other emerging 
economies are facing, is the crippling bureaucracy and red tape that inflate transaction costs 
and prevent expedient transaction completion.  For instance, the average number of 
procedures (paperwork, filings, and registrations) needed to start a new business in Brazil is 17 
versus an average of 8 in the US.  Furthermore, setting up a new business typically takes an 
average of 166 days, compared to an average of 11 days in the US.4 Even at large, government 
sponsored and supported projects, red tape, endless paperwork, and redundant bureaucratic 
procedures inhibit the country’s cost competitiveness.  At ports, for instance, it can cost almost 
twice as much to load or unload a single container than it does in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and 
almost three times as much as it does in Asia.  In some cases, six different agencies require 
paperwork on individual shipments.5 
 
Figure 2 World Rankings of Ease of Doing Business in Brazil
6
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The third factor that is stifling the economy is the extremely complex and costly tax 
structure that businesses have to deal with.  Morgan Stanley estimates that companies spend 
2600 hours a year preparing, filing, and paying taxes.  Furthermore, these taxes consume 36-
38% of GDP, a European sized chunk, but Brazilians get nowhere near the public services that 
Europeans get.7,8  
These three factors combined have been affecting business for so long that they have 
their own name in Portuguese, custo Brasil9 or the cost of doing business in Brazil.  The 
government is working hard to address these concerns by enacting policies and measures 
designed to reduce bureaucracy, improve infrastructure, attract private investment, and rein in 
taxes. Now in its second phase, the Growth Acceleration Program (or PAC), first launched in 
2007, helped Brazil weather the financial storm better than most countries. Under the second 
phase, $527 Billion will be spent during the period 2011-14 on logistics, power generation and 
transmission, and social and urban infrastructure projects.10   
Additionally, there are ongoing efforts to attract private sector investment to finance major 
infrastructure projects because rising revenues (including those earmarked for the PAC 
projects) due to strong growth and falling tax evasion have dried up.11 However, investors are 
not interested due to the poor yields, lack of long term stable cash flows, and custo Brasil. 
 
- 10 - 
 
2 Current Power Situation  
Brazil has some very complex economic issues to tackle in the next few years.  Foremost 
among them is energy, a vital enabler of economic growth and social stability. Unfortunately, 
nowhere is custo Brasil more evident than in the power sector. Inadequate infrastructure, 
supply gaps, bureaucratic inefficiencies, exceptionally high taxes, and insufficient diversification 
of generation sources continue to undermine competitiveness of domestic industries and stifles 
economic growth.  
2.1 Grid Composition 
 Brazil is among the top five countries in the world in terms of technical potential for 
hydro-electricity generation.12 Additionally, the country has good solar and wind resource 
potential, not to mention the excellent soil 
conditions that make it the largest sugar 
producer, largest beef exporter, and second 
largest ethanol producer in the world (though 
with the best energy balance) and a major 
producer and exporter of other agricultural 
commodities.13  
In 2011, Brazil consumed 527.38 TWh14 of 
electricity, of which 81.9% or 466.8 TWh was 
generated from 929 operational hydro-electric plants that together accounted for 71% of 
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Brazil’s installed generation capacity of 115 GW15. 40% of the total hydropower generation was 
from large hydro dams located in north or north-east regions of the country16. These dams, 
located far away from the consumption centers in the southern part of the country, necessitate 
long transmission lines that result in substantial transmission and distribution losses and 
require major maintenance expenditure. In fact, transmission is one of the key challenges 
facing the power sector considering the additional hydropower capacity planned in the coming 
years. The next largest sources of electricity are biomass with 6.6%, natural gas with 4.4% and 
nuclear energy with 2.7% of the share.  
2.2 New Generation 
In the aftermath of the 2001 power crisis, Brazil has consciously focused on diversifying 
its energy supplies by overhauling its electricity auction and spot market system, introducing 
private participation in the provision of electricity services, expanding its net non-hydro 
generation capacity with other renewables, and backstopping potential intermittency from 
wind and hydro with thermal generation, mostly from natural gas (according to plans). 
Unprecedented discovery of oil and natural gas in the ‘Pre-Salt’ (or Pre-Sal) basin off the coast 
of South-East Brazil in 2007 has been integral to Brazil’s long-term energy strategy. Pre-Sal 
reserves could eventually unlock between 70-100 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), which 
could place Brazil among the top five oil producers in the world.17  However, political meddling 
with Petrobras has significantly hampered progress.  Since 2006, the government has capped 
petrol prices to protect the competitiveness of ethanol and combat inflation.  To meet rising 
demand, Petrobras has been forced to top up what it produces with imports, which it must 
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then sell at a loss.  Moreover, legal requirements to hire and buy parts locally have played 
havoc with budgets and schedules. As a result, production has consistently missed targets since 
then, the company recently posted its first quarterly loss in 13 years, and had to reduce it’s 
projected 2020 production target by 11%.18 
 Competitive electricity auctions since 2005 have done much to diversify the country’s 
grid mix, (see below), with large portions of new generation capacity coming from oil (12%), 
natural gas (10%), wind (10%), and biomass (7%). However, its longstanding priority of hydro 
development remains, with plans to build another 48 new dams totaling 38,000 MW by 
2021.19,20 Most notably, wind (eolica) and the discovered, but yet to be economically extracted, 
pre-salt natural gas based power is widely expected to assume a larger share of the new 
generation capacity being planned.  
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2.3 Challenges   
In order to keep pace with growth, Brazil needs to bring an average of 4.5% additional 
electricity supply per year. Government electricity supply projections assert that this demand 
growth will be met, but are premised on efficient infrastructure and optimistic capacity factors 
for power supplies that come online. The three biggest obstacles to Brazil meeting the 4.5% per 
annum are that hydro capacity factors do not take into account the possibility of drought, 
transmission infrastructure projects are behind schedule, and the cost of electricity delivery is 
so heavily taxed that electricity consumers are dis-incentivized to grow. 
2.3.1 Supply Gaps due to Inadequate Infrastructure 
In spite of government’s ambitious plans to grow electricity generation, Brazil continues 
to face supply gaps due to inadequate generation infrastructure. Electricity consumption is 
expected to grow at the rate of 4.5% per annum until 2021, as per a study by EPE, the energy 
research arm of the Brazilian government.21  While there are ambitious plans to establish new 
assets to meet the projected rising electricity demand, as of now, generation continues to fall 
short of consumption. Last year, Brazil imported 7.8% of its electricity consumption, while 
losing 16.4% of the total electricity generated domestically (including imports net of exports) to 
transmission and distribution losses.22 The large losses are a function of high reliance on large-
scale hydro power plants located in the Northern and Northeastern part of the country, 
thousands of miles away from the load centers in the South and Southeast.  
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The latest in a string of massive blackouts last year affected 53 million people and put 
the spotlight squarely on the country’s aging and inadequate infrastructure and its level of 
preparation for the upcoming FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games.23 While government 
attributed the blackouts to unforeseen circumstances, there is consensus among industry 
analysts for the need for urgent investment in maintaining and upgrading the massive, aging 
transmission lines that connect large dams in the north to load centers in the south. 
2.3.2 Taxes and High Cost of Electricity   
The cost of electricity is exceptionally high in Brazil.  Different sources claim average 
industrial rates to be between $160 and $183 per MWh. Firjan, a Rio based metals and mining 
industry association claims that the average cost per kilowatt-hour in Brazil is 50% more than 
the world average and 134% more than other BRIC countries (Russia, India, and China).24 
Countrywide, an astonishing 45% of the average electricity bill goes towards transmission and 
distribution taxes. 25,26 These high costs make neighboring countries like Paraguay look more 
attractive for energy intensive industries to consider for expansion or even relocation.27 In 
August, the government gave a temporary 28% electricity rate cut to industrial users (bringing 
the rate down to around $128/MWh), which is expected to reduce material and manufacturing 
costs by 4%. This move reduced an estimated $6.4 Billion in revenues to electric utilities, but 
improved the positions of metals and mining companies, who cite the cost of electricity to be 
one their greatest expenditures. Alcoa, the aluminum producer claims the cost of electricity to 
amount to 40% of total costs.28   
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Figure 3 "Sparking Recovery" The Economist, 15 Sept. 2012 
Critics contend that such cuts deplete much needed revenue for reinvestment in 
electricity T&D infrastructure.  This concern is affirmed, at least in part, by the fact, when Ms. 
Roussef approved the rate cut, she also renewed contracts for 85,000 km of transmission lines 
that were due to expire. Without this renewal, Eletrobras and major state owned utilities would 
have had to re-bid their contracts in auction. If this had happened, they might have lost out to 
international companies with more cash to invest in the transmission system.29 While this 
would be a benefit to the grid, Brazil is very protective of its monopoly on energy management. 
2.3.3 Insufficient Diversification 
Brazil faced an unprecedented drop in water levels at its large hydroelectric facilities in 
2001 that led to widespread economic slowdown, hardship for people, and rationing of 
electricity by the government.30  Over the years, the country has diversified its generation to 
include significant thermal capacity. However, with 81.9% of its generation still coming from 
hydropower31, the last rainless summer has once again brought the country’s energy supply 
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into question. Another 26.5 GW of large-scale hydro dams are under construction in the 
northern region of the country32. Overall, another 48 dams are slated to come online by 202033. 
This will only increase the risk that the country faces due to fluctuations in water levels due to 
many reasons including, large scale deforestation in Amazonian rainforest, climate change, and 
over exploitation of Amazon river.  
3 Case for Biomass   
The Brazilian energy research institute, EPE, anticipates that biomass will generate 5.5% 
of the country’s electricity in 2020, and 11% by 2030.34  In order to do that, 450 MW/year in 
additional capacity is required between now and then, which we do not believe is practically 
achievable, particularly considering the low cost of hydro and wind power.  Most of this growth 
is expected to come from sugar cane bagasse, which currently generates 78% of biomass-fueled 
electricity.35 Since the financial crisis, sugar and ethanol mills are heavily debt burdened, and 
recent draught conditions have left them struggling to keep pace with production demand.36 
This circumstance has made the sugar sector uninterested in getting involved in the business of 
fuel supply, especially for small-scale power systems. Based on electricity auction results, it 
appears that utility-scale biomass power plants are able to broker fuel supply contracts. 
Eucalyptus is emerging as an attractive renewable fuel source of choice for DG 
customers, particularly in the industrial sector. Almost 2.5 million hectares of eucalyptus 
already grow in the South-Central region, with another 800,000 hectares in the Northeast.37 
Petrochemical companies, iron and steel mills, the food and beverage industry, and grain 
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processing facilities are all starting to explore the possibility of eucalyptus pellet fueled DG 
systems. According to biomass energy consultants, when their electricity consumption profile, 
steam/cooling demand are high, and the logistics of fuel transport are ideal, self-generation 
from eucalyptus makes economic sense. Although bagasse will always remain the greatest net 
contributor to the biomass fuel market, we believe that eucalyptus ‘fuel’ plantations will 
become the predominant source of fuel feedstock for industrial DG.  
3.1.1 Sugarcane bagasse 
  Sugarcane bagasse, the leftover stalk and residue from sugar production (approx. 30% 
of the harvest mass38) commands most of the attention for biomass power applications in 
Brazil. Bagasse has an impressive heating value (17-19 MJ/kg, just under half that of natural 
gas), constitutes 78% of the 
biomass market, currently 
generates about 2,200 MW of 
power (or 6.6% of net 
electricity generated) and has 
the technical potential to 
generate between 9,000 and 
12,000 MW of power by 2020.39,40 However, despite its abundance and relative proximity to 
electricity load centers (especially compared to hydro and wind), sugar mills remain poorly 
positioned to supply biomass as fuel for power applications or electricity generation. For 
starters, the main driver of the sugar business is ethanol production, and international sugar 
Figure 4 Analysis of combustive uses of bio-combustibles Source EPE 2012 
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demand is a close second.  Delivering or supplying waste products from sugar harvest is a 
distant third.   
Brazil’s 433 sugar mills and 440 bioethanol refineries have their hands full with keeping 
pace with the investment required to meet market demand for sugar exports and domestic 
ethanol for transport fuel, estimated at $490 billion by 2030.41  The situation is further 
complicated by the logistics of fuel procurement from a fragmented (albeit consolidating) 
sector, transportation across poor roads, only 14% of which are paved, some risk that fuel 
supply contracts will not be honored, and an incipient domestic fuel consumption market.42 
. 
Despite these barriers, bagasse fueled power plants have successfully competed in 
energy auctions with a produced price (the price of electricity leaving the generating station, 
prior to transmission) of $.07/kWh43.  Most of these projects have been in the states of Mato 
Grasso and Sao Paulo, which make up the country’s South-Central region and crush more than 
half of the country’s sugar crop. Unfortunately for biomass interests, since 2009 wind and 
hydro projects have been consistently bidding projects estimated to produce electricity for 
between $.062/kWh and $.045/kWh respectively.44  Currently, it is only possible for a biomass 
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fueled system to beat the $.07/kWh threshold for specific projects where factors such as 
logistics, availability of biomass, and the energy consumption profile of the client are ideal.45  
 
90% of Brazilian sugarcane is produced within black box, not far from the country’s most  
prominent industrial and municipal electric load centers 
 
All of Brazil’s 433 sugar mills are energy self sufficient, and about 100 sell electricity back 
to the grid.  Sugar mills, however, are not likely to become significantly more invested in 
contributing to either regional or distributed electricity generation markets.  Augmenting the 
amount of electricity imputed to the grid requires tens of millions of dollars per retrofit, which 
presents a risky investment for an enterprise that doesn’t see direct benefit from being a player 
in the electricity market. Without support to finance power system retrofits, or a guarantee 
from state or federal governments that they will purchase produced electricity on the spot-
market, greater participation in this market is far too expensive, particularly considering market 
demands for sugar and ethanol and the financial woes of the industry.46 New boilers would be 
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needed to generate steam at higher pressure, along with controls equipment, and expensive 
monitoring and safety devices that the government requires for net generator’s in order to 
document and respond to electricity supply-demand dynamics.47 
A 2012 survey by the International Sugar Organization found that half of all sugar mills 
were facing money problems.48  Meanwhile, C. Czarnikow Futures Ltd, a sugar and ethanol 
trading and advisory firm, estimates that the Brazilian sugar industry may need as much as $490 
billion in investment by 2030 to keep pace with sugar and ethanol demand.49  This is largely a 
result of the combined effects of a credit and commodities boom in the years preceding the 
2008 economic meltdown.50  The worst drought in 50 years is not helping.51  Deviating business 
models to include fuel procurement under such conditions does not make business sense 
despite the technical potential of the millions of tons of waste product from every sugar 
harvest. 
Nevertheless, the industrial segment is well aware of the technical potential of biomass 
and has taken notice of the fuel opportunities presented by bagasse and other biomass 
residues, notably eucalyptus.  Presently, an entire industry is developing to export bagasse 
pellets to Europe, where they are eligible for CDM credits, and utility scale biomass plants are 
the only viable option for achieving the government’s ambitious 2020 biomass power goals.  In 
the meantime, Industry is making headway procuring fuel from the country’s second largest 
source of biomass, eucalyptus.   
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3.1.2 Eucalyptus Market 
Historically, eucalyptus growth has mostly been confined to Brazil’s paper and pulp 
segment, consisting of about 220 mills, as well as fiberboard and other wood products 
manufacturing companies.52 Like their counterparts in sugar and ethanol, paper and pulp mills 
are entirely energy self-sufficient, fueled mostly by wood residues leftover from paper 
production, known as black liquor. 
In terms of business model, the biggest difference between bagasse and eucalyptus is 
that bagasse is collected or contracted from a sugar mill whereas eucalyptus is essentially 
harvested from a ‘fuel plantation’. Recent trends suggest that plantations will either be 
vertically integrated into the self-generator’s operation, or maintained by a long-term 
management and fuel supply contract.  We have confirmed this assertion with bioenergy 
consultants Energia Renovais do Brazil, Thermopyla Bioenergia SA, POYRY, and ABIB.  DOW 
Chemicals is pioneering this model with their Aratinga wood-to-energy plant in Bahia state, 
which will replace a natural gas-fired steam system at a petrochemical facility with a eucalyptus 
fueled cogeneration unit.53 
The Brazilian Industrial Biomass and Renewable Energy Association predicts that the 
current technical potential of eucalyptus fuel to be equivalent to 896 MW of power, and that 
about half of that is economically recoverable, suggesting around 450 MW is available from this 
source to generate facility electricity and process steam.54 
- 22 - 
 
In 2011, ERB was reported to be completing three biomass projects in addition to the 
DOW one, and reviewing an additional three. When we contacted ERB, POYRY, and Thermopyla 
Sustainability throughout the fall of 2012 and early winter 2013, our correspondence suggested 
a similar amount of activity, all based on eucalyptus fueled systems, and each attempting to be 
eligible for DG incentives.55 The level of discretion that characterized our conversations gives us 
reason to believe that this space is n fact growing, but is extremely competitive and that 
achieving acceptable levelized costs of electricity remains challenging. 
 
Figure 5 Industrial consumption of Charcoal by sector
56
 
Like bagasse, most eucalyptus plantations are located in the industrial, South-Central 
region, predominately in the states of Minas Gerais (1.4 million hectares) and Sao Paulo (1.04 
million hectares), with large quantities spread across the Northeast region (Paraiba, 
Pernambuco, Alagoas), a burgeoning industrial area.  Minas Gerais also has the greatest 
concentration of iron and steel mills, which are being incentivized by regulators to reduce the 
volume of native wood consumed to fuel their charcoal furnaces in exchange for renewable 
feedstocks such as eucalyptus. The consultancy POYRY estimates that this charcoal market, 
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which consumes 88% of domestic coal production, is the greatest opportunity area for 
eucalyptus fuel providers and brokers. 57  While this does not necessarily correspond with the 
DG market, in terms of measures to reduce industrial driven deforestation and enhance the use 
of renewable fuels, it is significant. 
 
Figure 6 - Eucalyptus production by State
58
 
Brazilian iron and steel companies already own more than 1 million ha of eucalyptus 
plantations.  Industry trade associations and energy consultants assert that iron and steel mills 
will increase their eucalyptus land holdings by a factor of two in order to match furnace-fuel 
demand to keep pace with anticipated resumptions in iron and steel.  Additionally, government 
legislation aimed at restricting timber products, such as charcoal, from being harvested from 
native forests has been acknowledged by industry as a regulatory driver as well as a common 
‘sustainability’ goal.59 The trouble, like with bagasse, remains transport cost, which can account 
for 40-50% of the cost of electricity produced by a biomass plant.60 
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Companies like Vale, Anglo American, Gerdau, Usiminas, and others all have made 
concerted efforts to improve the non-hydro renewable component of their energy mix.61  Vale 
has it’s own renewable energy division, Rio Tinto has joined a partnership with GE Energy to 
explore renewables, and Anglo has already replaced 30% of the hydro capacity for one of its 
iron ore plants with wood pellets.62,63,64  They perceive hydro intermittency and high taxes for 
grid electricity to be unacceptable expenditures. For instance, Vale reported that energy and 
fuel amounts to 13% of the cost of goods sold in 2011.65  With the global materials and metals 
market still reeling from the lingering effects of the 2007 financial crisis, incurring such costs for 
basic services like electricity suggest alternatives ought to be explored. 
3.2 Complementarity of Biomass with long term energy security 
Importantly, supporting industrial self-generation of biomass-fueled power is 
complementary to existing energy and infrastructure policy objectives.  Bagasse fueled power is 
a natural hedge against the grid’s hydro system; it is cheapest during the dry season, when 
reservoir levels are at their lowest. As we have mentioned earlier, despite this logic, a robust 
bagasse power market remain a few years away. 
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Figure 7 Zilmar, Jose de Souza. (September, 2012) Bagasse Cogeneration in the Brazilian Ethanol Industry, slide 6  
Inside of the next five years, however, Brazil is set to invest $66 billion in roads, which will 
reduce the most significant cost of biomass fuel procurement- transportation, which can 
account for 40-60% of the levelized cost of electricity (the cost of electricity produced, including 
capital, O&M, depreciation, and fuel costs) generated from a biomass system.  As road 
conditions are improved, traffic, accidents, and travel time will be reduced, and it can be 
reasonably expected that biomass fuel prices will decrease.   The cost of electricity, especially in 
the form of transmission and distribution (T&D) taxes on industrial consumers, has significantly 
prevented industrial companies from investing in other forms of capacity management, IT, and 
personnel training.66  Self-generation of any form will allow companies to re-allocate capital 
from tax expenses to investments that enhance operational efficiencies.  Lastly, grid stability is 
critical for sustained economic growth, and long distance transmission of electricity from 
drought affected hydro reservoirs continually threatens to plunge large regions of the country 
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(especially the Northeast) into darkness.  By generating their own steam and electricity on site, 
not only will self-generators (DG or larger scale) achieve security of supply, but also will shave 
the amount of future electricity growth demanded.  The government ought to see the industrial 
sector as an opportunity area in this regard, as industrial electricity use is expected to increase 
from 26% of net electricity consumed to 50% by 2020.67 
Last, but not least, the cost of electricity is a long-standing and well-documented point 
of contention between Brazil’s strategic industries (iron, steel, aluminum, and paper/pulp) and 
the government.  The average cost of electricity is the third highest in the world, at $160/MW, 
with peak rates as high as $500/MW.  Under the right conditions, when factoring in the 
invariable cost of electricity produced, generating power from biomass can be much less than 
from the grid when factoring in peak charges. 
These factors, among others, make the case for biomass power applications more than 
just a ‘cause célèbre’ for renewable energy advocates.  When logistics and the power profile of 
an energy consumer align, the economics of biomass-fueled self-generation are favorable to 
delivered electricity.  Perhaps more importantly, by doing so, the industrial segment will reduce 
electricity demand for which the governments projections of hydro and wind power capacity 
factors may not be prepared to supply. 
3.3 Economics of Biomass Power 
Estimates on the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) from a biomass plant range from 
$.06/kWh-$29/kWh.   The two most prominent factors affecting the large price range are the 
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cost of collecting the biomass, and the cost of transporting it.68 Thompson Reuters calculated 
that the transportation costs account for 40% of truck delivered commodity costs,69 which 
corresponds with our observation that fuel delivery costs are a major barrier to biomass power 
playing a more prominent role in the electricity grid.   
For sugarcane bagasse, the price is seasonally variable. During the fall and spring sugar 
harvest, the price of biomass approaches the higher end when sugar mills are preoccupied with 
sugar production. In the winter, which corresponds to the dry season and when sugar 
plantations are fallow, sugar mills sometimes have to pay someone to haul bagasse away at 
cost or burn it. This circumstance makes mill owners more receptive to selling this resource for 
profit. 
The cost eucalyptus is more affected by the costs of plantation management, including 
equipment, seeding, maintenance, and production. Industrial companies that we have 
observed making inroads to eucalyptus production typically have no expertise in the agriculture 
business, so they have been developing joint ventures or signing long-term contracts to 
consultants like ERB, Green Energy Group, Brazil Bioenergy SA, and others who can manage the 
plantations and fuel production.  The up-front costs of such an arrangement can be 
considerable, but this business model is premised on the assumption that over time, electricity 
produced from eucalyptus fuel produced in this manner can be cheaper than grid electricity 
when accounting for peak charges and production lost due to intermittency.70 
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3.3.1 Analysis – LCOE 
Based on our assumptions and analysis for a typical 30 MW Eucalyptus fueled Biomass 
based Distributed Generation power system, electricity could be produced at a cost of 
$0.0625/kwh. At this rate, biomass could prove to be competitive with hydropower 
($0.045/kwh) and wind energy ($0.065/kwh), provided fuel could be provided at a cost of 
$27/ton. LCOE of a typical biomass fuel plant (keeping all else equal) is highly sensitive to the 
cost of fuel. With the right infrastructure and transportation costs, partnernships similar to ERB 
and DOW cogeneration contract could be replicated across the country and thus lead to higher 
uptake in Biomass based self-generation. For more detailed assumption, please refer to Exhibits 
in the Appendix section. 
4 Future Scenario 
Brazil’s economic future is highly dependent on its ability to successfully meet its energy 
and power needs. As discussed earlier, this is in turn critically dependent on its ability to 
operate its mega dams at capacity. That in turn in dependent on sufficient rainfall in the 
Amazon basin, home to most of the large dams that supply most of Brazil’s electricity needs. 
However, Brazil’s economic development has resulted in an alarming deterioration in the 
Amazonian region. The large deforestation over the last 50 years to clear land for farming 
agricultural commodities and rearing cattle, is now reaching a scale that threatens to set off 
what scientists have termed the great Amazonian dieback. In such a scenario Amazon, one of 
single richest ecosystems left in the world, will witness a massive biomass destruction that will 
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turn it from a net sink to a net source of carbon, drastically accelerating the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
The Amazon region is larger than the European Union combined with a size of around 7 
million square kilometers71. 40.5 % of the hydropower potential for Brazil is located in Amazon. 
The region produced 20% of the world’s flow of fresh water into the oceans and has the 
potential to generate 260 GW of electricity, more than twice the current installed capacity of 
115 GW of Brazil72. While it is important to harness this massive potential, the rate at which 
development can take place needs to be urgently slowed or regulated. World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) estimates that 17% of the forest in the Amazon has been cleared to develop cattle 
ranches over the last 50 years. At least 30 more dams are being planned in the region and the 
government is planning to generate as much as 50% of the country’s electricity needs through 
these mega dams. However, it is imperative that the large scale deforestation, fire and 
destruction is stopped before it reaches calamitous proportions and starts an irreversible 
decline of the ecosystem. Described below are the three reasons why this needs to be stemmed 
at the earliest. 
4.1 Water Cycle  
All the major dams that supply electricity to the country are located in the Amazonian 
region. One of the largest, most expensive, intensely opposed, and over budget dams, Belo 
Monte, is being built in the Amazonian region. The dam threatens to destroy 120,000 acres of 
Amazonian Rainforest and displace thousands of people. The estimates from number of dams 
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planned by Brazilian government range from 30 to 150. Far from being a shining example of 
development, the project threatens to worsen the water cycle of the region. According to 
numerous studies, further deterioration in the Amazonian ecosystem will lead to a more 
extreme water cycle, making rainy season wetter and summers drier. The ongoing extreme 
drought is clearly an example of such a phenomenon. These extremes will inundate the dams 
with excess water in one season and not enough in the others, leading to alarming shortages 
and possibility of more blackouts in the country. 
4.2 Carbon Sink  
The Amazonian region absorbs close to a billion tons of carbon every year, cleaning the 
environment in the process and slowing down our march towards a scenario of 450ppm of 
carbon dioxide in the air, widely believed to be the point of no return for the climate system. If 
the deforestation continues at the present rate, the region will soon become a net source of 
carbon, releasing carbon in the air, further accelerating the point of no return. Every dam that is 
built leads to diversion of rivers and flooding of the forest area. This in turn leads to rotting of 
vegetation and release of more potent greenhouse gases such as methane. Brazil cannot 
continue to reap the benefits of hydropower, touting the country’s low carbon emissions due to 
a renewable energy based grid, while ignoring the externalities of building dams and diverting 
rivers and destroying forests. 
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4.3 Dieback  
As discussed earlier, if the decline continues, there is a very real risk that we will witness 
what the scientists are calling the great Amazon Dieback, wherein the forest biomass will enter 
into precipitous and irreversible decline and will ultimately cease to exist, in turn releasing 
billions of tons of carbon in the air. This frightening phenomenon will have ramification for the 
entire planet and not just for Brazil or the South American region. This has been confirmed by 
numerous studies, one of the most notable amongst them being the World Bank Study titled 
“Assessment of the Risk of Amazon Dieback”. According to it, the probability of the dieback 
varies between the different part of the Amazon but its overall severity increases over time. 
The study further warns that there is not only a need to slow the large scale destruction of 
Amazon but also to slow down anthropogenic emission so as not to severely accelerate this 
phenomenon. Ultimately, “Amazon dieback should be considered a threshold for dangerous 
climate change”. 
Marked (Figure 8) below are the five major Geographical Domains in the Amazon Basin.  
The region of Southern Amazonia is liable to be the one most affected by strong land use 
change drivers. Northwestern Amazonia is not likely to be impacted by the changes in Amazon. 
However, Eastern and Northeaster Amazonia are already experience drier conditions and 
witnessing the effects of direct anthropogenic impact.  
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Figure 8 Geographical Domains in Amazon 
Unfortunately, as depicted below (Figure 9) these are the dams are unfortunately planned in 
exactly the same regions, where the effects of Amazon dieback are bound to be felt the most, 
leading to a devastating scenario that will drastically affect Southern Brazil. 
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Figure 9 Dams planned in Amazon 




Low-Low is the most optimum scenario for Brazil to be in. However, to keep the economy 
humming, Brazil will have to keep its cost of energy low. This will not be possible with the 
continued focus on building expensive mega dams. The destruction in Amazon is bound to 
further increase climate change risk, which will in turn make capacity factors for dams even 
lower and making the electricity even costlier.  
We believe that Brazil has reached a negative equilibrium where even small disturbances 
can push the system away from the stable state into a self-perpetrating loop that could prove 
to be catastrophic for the country. Brazil should do everything to remain in the Low-Low region 
to maintain a healthy economy and environment. 
- 35 - 
 
5 Conclusions  
Considering the observed effects of climate trends in Brazil, the country’s dependence on 
hydro presents near-term and long-term problems for electricity consumers. In 2001, low 
reservoirs levels resulted in costly and embarrassing blackouts.  This energy ‘crisis’ galvanized 
the government to overhaul its electricity regulatory regime, privatize much of the energy 
industry, implement a sophisticated electricity auction system, and develop a comprehensive 
long-term energy strategy.  Despite reducing the proportion of hydro in the grid matrix from 
88% in 2001 to 70% in 2012 and projections of reaching 67% in the next few years, persistent 
drought, which is being exacerbated by continued deforestation, suggests that the grid is 
susceptible to blackouts during the dry season, and that future hydro outputs are overly 
optimistic.73  Electricity auctions have been successful at diversifying the grid composition, but 
price dynamics favoring hydro and wind render other sources, such as biomass, uncompetitive.  
This restricts opportunity to further diversify.  Importantly, the country’s energy expansion 
plans barely meet the country’s electricity growth demand, and is premised on hydro capacity 
factor projections that do not account for the probability of drought. Weather over the past 
three years and climate models suggest otherwise.  
 Even if the government were to offer unprecedented support for biomass power 
development, it would be unlikely to resolve the country’s looming energy shortfalls. To 
insulate themselves from the risks presented by electricity intermittency, electricity intensive 
industrial operations should become more energy self-sufficient.  Objectively, natural gas is 
probably the preferred fuel, but the likelihood of pre-sal74 production and requisite distribution 
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infrastructure to come online in time is slim. Meanwhile, thousands of megawatts worth of 
biomass fuel happen to grow in states that are co-located with Brazil’s industrial centers. The 
number of industrial DG systems in Brazil is few right now, but we expect businesses with high 
electricity, steam, and cooling needs to explore meeting these energy demands with biomass 
over the next couple of years. 
Our evaluation of the biomass market concluded that, despite the enormous technical 
potential of sugarcane bagasse (estimated at 9,500 MW by 2020), eucalyptus is the more 
economical fuel source.  In terms of net electricity generated, sugarcane bagasse is, and will 
continue to be, the predominant feedstock for biomass power systems, but the variable cost of 
bagasse fuel procurement for a sub-30 MW power system make it a less attractive fuel source 
than eucalyptus. 
Metals and mining, petrochemical, and grain processing companies are starting to explore 
opportunities for eucalyptus fueled power systems.  The logistics of long-term fuel supply 
contracts from a eucalyptus plantation are much more straightforward than from a sugar 
plantation, which is primarily interested in keeping pace with sugar and ethanol demand. 
The greatest challenge for biomass power projects is competing with the cost of grid 
electricity. Hydro and wind developers submit project bids to electricity auctions based on 
produced power prices between $.045 and $.065/kWh, which is substantially less than what is 
produced by a biomass system and do not necessarily include the capital costs. When logistics 
and the electricity needs of an electricity consumer are ideal, the cost of electricity produced 
from a DG biomass system can break the $.07/kWh threshold, at which point it makes 
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economic sense to pursue, but until road infrastructure improves, these scenarios will be more 
the exception than the rule. We did not model the potential costs of grid intermittency, the 
possibility of higher peak charges, and increases in transmission and distribution taxes, but have 
been told that avoiding these costs are a major incentive for electricity consumers to explore 
generating electricity on-site from biomass. 
The greatest opportunity for biomass power rests in the fact that it is a non-hydro, carbon 
neutral fuel source. Companies like Vale, Alcoa, Anglo American, and DOW Chemical have all 
gone on record, in both annual reports and interviews with executives, about their interest in 
reducing their environmental footprint by developing non-hydro renewable power resources. 
With climate change posing a great threat to the viability of hydro based system, the 
government would be prescient to enable industrial electricity consumers to take advantage of 
DG incentives by allowing for write-offs of these investments, and supporting producers of 
biomass, who currently see little opportunity in this market because auction price dynamics 
favor other power projects, notably hydro, but also wind, neither of which are safe bets in the 
event that the climate continues to warm. 
5.1 Policy Recommendations 
Electricity growth and infrastructure improvement is central to the Brazilian 
government’s development strategy over the next ten years. Regulators ought to consider 
investments in biomass power complementary to these goals; a hedge against hydro 
vulnerabilities, an additional source of revenue for struggling sugar mills, and reduced cost of 
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commodity transport. More explicit support for biomass power for industrial self-generation 
will have positive ripple effects across the economy.  By facilitating a linkage between 
agribusiness and electricity production, domestic companies in the power segment stand to 
capture billions of dollars of market share. Unlike for other applications, like wind and solar 
systems, domestic manufacturers can actually outcompete international firms in this space, 
which parlay’s well with existing policies to support domestic manufacturing. Of equal 
importance, every megawatt produced on site is one that does not need to be developed from 
another resource and transmitted long distances, incurring losses. 
Harnessing more biomass energy will commoditize a waste product and generate 
revenue for sugar and ethanol mills that are in great need of cash. A glance at Brazil’s electricity 
growth plans suggests that regulators are cutting it close in terms of delivering sufficient 
electricity to meet projected growth. For this reason, we support any efforts to augment 
electricity supply, but the low carbon nature of biomass and its preponderance in areas co-
located with electricity load demand makes the case for biomass particularly compelling. An 
especially creative means to this end is to incentivize industrial companies to build on-site 
power systems. Our research suggests that eucalyptus is the most economical fuel type. 
To achieve these goals, we recommend the following policy provisions. 
1. The Ministry of Mines & Environment (MME) develop contingency plans to include 
biomass baseload in addition to thermal complementarity to wind and hydro starting in 
2016 
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2. Establish regular working group consisting of relevant trade associations and leading 
companies with interests in biomass power (UNICA, ABIB, COGEN, ORPLANO, ERB, 
Brazil Biomass Energy SA) to coordinate dialogue to inform policy craft for biomass 
fueled renewable power 
3. Offer incentives, such as tax write-offs, to industrial electricity consumers that reduce 
their reliance on the grid through biomass power systems 
4. Focus road infrastructure improvements on areas that will reduce the transport costs 
between centers of sugar production (South-Central and Northeast regions) and 
concentrations of industrial activity 
5. Introduce geographic considerations into auction price dynamics to account for the cost 
of transmission and distribution infrastructure and the associated losses from distant 
sources of power generation 
Rationale 
Recommendation # 1 is in line with existing policy goals to ensure that Brazil’s electric 
grid is not subjected to brown-outs or black outs. A cursory glance at the country’s electricity 
expansion plans shows that Brazil will just barely meet power demand. Based on recent 
drought, it is fair to assume that hydro capacity factors will be compromised in the summer 
during the dry season, which will invariably cause electricity intermittency similar to the 
shortages in 2001 and this past December 2012. 
Recommendation #2 aims to ensure that the government has a platform to leverage 
expertise directly from industry. Currently, there is a gap between federal government rhetoric 
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and local government capabilities. The private sector acknowledges the potential of biomass 
power, and agrees that national plans to augment supplies from this source are mutually 
beneficial, but also recognizes the limitations of state and local governments in achieving those 
goals. A workgroup of this sort will give direct line of sight between federal policy initiatives and 
local project viability. 
Recommendation #3 would make the substantial investments in on-site power/steam 
systems more attractive. The industrial sector accounts for a quarter of electricity use in Brazil, 
and this proportion is due to double by 202175, which puts great stress on the grid. Every 
megawatt that is generated onsite is a megawatt that no longer needs to be delivered by aging 
transmission infrastructure. The technical expertise to become self-generators is already 
mature; what remains absent is the financial incentive to reduce risks associated with such 
investments. If industrial electricity consumers transition towards a self-generation model, 
electricity demand that might otherwise increase the probability of blackouts can be reduced. 
Recommendation #4 could be an addendum to existing PAC 2 road infrastructure 
investments. Presently, it costs twice as much to get commodities from farm to port as it does 
to ship them from port to China, which significantly compromises Brazil’s global 
competitiveness.76  Fortunately, the sugar producing south-central and northeast regions are 
also the country’s major economic centers, therefore improvements to road networks used 
between concentrations of sugar mills industrial centers will reduce transaction times and 
costs, which are estimated to account for 40% of the cost of delivered products.   
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Our final recommendation, that auction price dynamics account for the transmission 
distance between the site of generation and electricity load centers, will internalize the 
associated cost of T&D infrastructure required for hydro and wind projects. These costs are 
currently not reflected in the cost of delivered electricity, but will eventually be passed on to 
consumers through electricity taxes. If auctions were able to capture these costs, the playing 
field between biomass and other forms will level out. 
 
 





Figure 10  Ministry of Mines and Energy -MME, Company of Energy Research - EPE, ␣Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia 
2020␣. Brasilia; MME/EPE, 2011. 
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Biomass Based Power Plant Model Screenshots -  
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